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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 08-2951
                           
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BRETT STYER,
 a/k/a FLY,
                                      Appellant
                          
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 02-cr-00570-001)
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis
                           
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 2, 2009
                           
Before: BARRY, WEIS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: March 25, 2009)
                           
OPINION
                           
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Defendant Brett Styer appeals the District Court’s June 6, 2008 order denying his
motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) for modification of his sentence in light of the
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recent retroactive amendment to the crack cocaine Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.  We will affirm. 
I.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Styer pled guilty on November 20, 2002 to a
13-count Superceding Information charging him with distribution of more than five
grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); distribution of
more than 5 grams of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 860; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).  Styer’s original guideline range was 151-188 months, based on an offense
level of 31 and a criminal history category of IV.  The District Court imposed a within-
guidelines sentence of 180 months incarceration on May 5, 2003.
By letter of May 21, 2008, the Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, as part of a screening committee that also includes members of
the United States Attorney’s Office and the Probation Office, notified the District Court
that Styer was eligible for a retroactive reduction of his sentence by virtue of the recent
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the applicable range for crack cocaine
offenses.  By order of June 6, 2008, the Court concluded that although Styer was eligible
for a reduction, “consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and the safety and welfare of the
public make reduction of Styer’s sentence inappropriate.” (App. 50.)  Styer then formally
moved for a reduction of sentence, citing, in addition to the amendment, his
       Counsel argued that Styer had “completed courses in impulse control, cooking,1
public speaking and parenting” and “prepared a video which was shown to a middle
school in Chester County to help dissuade students from participating in crimes.” (A. 53.) 
Several letters from schoolchildren that had seen the video were also submitted, along
with Styer’s own letter in which he acknowledged his criminal past but professed his
reformed ways.
       The District Court had jurisdiction to review Styer’s motion for modification of his2
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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commendable conduct post-conviction.   The Court again refused to reduce the sentence,1
referring to its order of June 6, 2008 and the justifications articulated therein. (A. 74.) 
Styer timely appealed that decision.
II.2
Effective November 1, 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission adopted
Amendment 706, which modified the guideline ranges applicable to crack cocaine
offenses and generally reduced by two the base offense levels for such offenses under §
2D1.1(c). U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007); see United States v. Wise, 515
F.3d 207, 220 (3rd Cir. 2008).  The Sentencing Commission later declared Amendment
706 to be retroactive. U.S.S.G. App. C., Amend. 713 (May 1, 2008).  
Styer sought a reduction of his sentence in accordance with Amendment 706 by
moving pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which provides, in relevant part:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994( o), upon
motion of the defendant . . . , the court may reduce the term of
imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to
the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
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The determination as to whether a reduction is warranted—“the court may reduce”
(emphasis added)—is committed to the discretion of the district court.  Accordingly, as
our sister circuits have held, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United
States v. Carter, 500 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Rodriguez-Pena, 470
F.3d 431, 432 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir.
2005).     
Styer argues: (1) that the District Court denied him due process in resolving his §
3582(c)(2) motion without a hearing; (2) that the denial of that motion was predicated, in
part, on an erroneous and unsupported factual conclusion; and (3) that his unmodified
sentence is substantively unreasonable.  He urges us to remand with an instruction that the
Court consider a modified sentence within the amended guideline range of 121-151
months, the same range suggested by the Federal Community Defender’s Office in its
letter to the Court of May 21, 2008.   None of these contentions has merit.   
A.
Styer was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his § 3582(c)(2) motion. 
Section 1B1.10(a)(3) clearly states that “proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and
this policy statement do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10(a)(3); see also United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 210 (3d Cir. 2000)
(distinguishing between a full resentencing and a proceeding under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2)).  Instead, courts are constrained to consider only the retroactive amendment at
       While Styer cites several cases in which courts have ordered factual hearings on §3
3582(c) motions, none stands for the proposition that a court must do so on all such
motions. (Appellant’s Br. 12.)  Moreover, Styer’s reliance on United States v. Byfield, 391
F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2004), is misplaced.  While the D.C. Circuit in Byfield reversed and
remanded where the district court denied without a hearing the defendant’s motion to
modify his sentence under § 3582(c)(2), the factual question in that case was whether a
listed amendment at issue had the effect of lowering the defendant’s sentence in
accordance with § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). See id. at 280-81.  The question before us is
fundamentally different.  Here, there is no dispute that Amendment 706 rendered Styer
eligible for a reduced sentence; the relevant question, however, is whether a reduction
was warranted.  
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issue and are instructed to “leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” Id.
§ 1B1.10(b)(1); see United States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 615 (3d Cir. 2002).  As other
Courts of Appeals have found, “a proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) is not a do-over
of an original sentencing proceeding where a defendant is cloaked in rights mandated by
statutory law and the Constitution.” United States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir.
1999); see United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2000).  Indeed, according
to Rule 43(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant “need not be
present” for a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(4).   3
How a court decides to consider a § 3582(c)(2) motion is a matter of discretion.
See Tidwell, 178 F.3d at 949.  Here, the District Court, which had sentenced Styer in the
first instance, was familiar with the facts of the case and in the best position to determine
whether a hearing was warranted.  The Court considered Styer’s factual arguments before
concluding that a reduction was not warranted.  Critically, Styer does not identify what
information he would have presented at a hearing that he did not include in the papers
       We also note that the commentary to § 1B1.10 provides that courts may consider4
post-conviction conduct but are under no obligation to do so. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt.
n.1(B)(iii).  
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supporting his motion.  Accordingly, the Court acted within its discretion when it
determined that a hearing was not necessary.
B.
Next, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Styer
continued to pose a threat to public safety.  The record demonstrates that the Court
recognized Styer’s rehabilitative efforts and, in fact, commended him on his “progress
since incarceration.” (A. 74.)  Ultimately, however, the Court concluded that this single
factor did not override the concerns articulated in its order of June 6, 2008, including the
nature of Styer’s crime, his criminal history, his use of firearms, the need for deterrence,
and public safety.   While Styer disagrees with the comparatively little weight the Court4
accorded his post-conviction conduct in relation to other factors, we cannot conclude that
the Court’s reasoned balancing of those factors was an abuse of discretion.   
C.
Finally, we consider whether Styer’s unmodified sentence of 180 months was
substantively reasonable, that is, “‘whether the district judge imposed the sentence he or
she did for reasons that are logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section
3553(a).’” United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir.2005)).  In proceedings under § 3582(c)(2),
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the § 3553(a) factors are supplemented by the directive that the court “consider the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that may be posed by a
reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(b)(ii). 
As the district court is in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence, we may
not reverse simply because we would have imposed a different sentence. United States v.
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).  Rather, we must ensure that the sentence, even if
beyond the guideline range, is “within the broad range of possible sentences that can be
considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.   
Styer argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the
reduction for which he was eligible per Amendment 706.  We disagree.  Taken as a
whole, and given the deferential standard with which we review sentencing
determinations, we find that the District Court’s decision to leave the sentence alone was
reached after consideration of the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and the commentary to §
1B1.10.  The Court stressed that Styer was a danger to the community, that he had shot
five times at a police officer, and that he had endeavored to conceal firearms from
investigators.  Thus, while the Court recognized Styer’s eligibility for a reduction under
the amended guidelines, it carefully articulated its reasons for not granting that reduction. 
This weighing and consideration of multiple factors, expressly left to a court’s discretion,
is exactly the type of “reasoned appraisal” to which we defer on review. Kimbrough v.
United States, 128 S.Ct. 558, 576 (2007).
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III.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying
the request for a modified sentence.
